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of the David I. McOmber 
Family Trust, 
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Bodell Construction Company petitions this Court for a 
writ of certiorari to review the decision of the Utah Court of 
Appeals issued in this matter on March 20, 1991, a copy of which is 
attached hereto in Appendix "A". 
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The parties to this action are all identified in the 
caption. 
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court error in concluding that there 
were no issues of material fact and that summary judgment was 
available against Bodell with respect to the following where: 
a. Associated Title (the trustee) and Bodell (the 
beneficiary) said Associated had no express authority to 
bid and the trial court concluded as a matter of law that 
Associated Title had actual authority to bid at the 
trustee' s sale for Bodell; 
b. Bodell never gave bid instructions to anyone and the 
trial court concluded as a matter of law that the trustee 
had actual authority to bid; 
c. Bodell never spoke to the trustor about Associated 
Title, and the trial court concluded as a matter of law 
that the trustee had apparent authority to bid; 
d. Bodell refused the trustee's deed and the trustor 
continued to live in the property after the sale, and the 
trial court concluded as a matter of law that Bodell 
ratified the unauthorized bid; 
e. Bodell never knew that bidding instructions were 
required or that the loan broker had given a loan payoff 
to Associated, and the trial court concluded as a matter 
of law that Associated' s bid was a unilateral error by 
Bodell. 
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2. Is a foreclosing trustee who bids at a foreclosure 
sale on behalf of a beneficiary, without express authorization to 
do so, automatically cloaked with implied or apparent authority to 
bid by virtue of the trust deed foreclosure statutes? 
3. Does a trustee's sale under Utah law, U. C. A. §57-1-
1, £i seq. , fall within the statute of frauds, U. C. A. §25-5-1, such 
that the authority of a trustee to bid and purchase at the sale on 
behalf of a beneficiary must be given in writing? 
4. Does a trustee' s sale under Utah law fall within the 
statute of frauds such that any ratification of a trustee' s bid at 
the sale must be in writing? 
Because the trial court granted summary judgment against 
Bodell, this court should construe the facts presented in these 
post-summary judgment proceedings in the light most favorable to 
Bodell. Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. State, 779 P. 2d 634 (Utah 
1989). 
OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
The official decision of the Utah Court of Appeals was 
issued on March 20, 1991. The decision was issued on that court' s 
Rule 31 calendar, and is not published. 
JURISDICTION 
A. The Utah Court of Appeals decision was issued March 
20, 1991. 
B. No order respecting rehearing or an extension of 
time to petition for certiorari has been made and none has been 
requested. 
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C. This petition for a writ of certiorari is filed 
within thirty (30) days after entry of the decision by the Utah 
Court of Appeals, and is timely under Rule 48, U. R. A. P. 
D. This court has jurisdiction to review the decision 
in this matter pursuant to the provisions of U. C. A. §§78-2-2(3)(a) 
and 78-2-2(5). 
CONTROLLING STATUTES 
The following rules and statutes are, in substantial 
part, determinative of the issues on appeal. 
Rule 56, U. R. C. P. ... The [summary] judgment sought shall 
be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law. 
U. C. A. §25-5-1. No estate or interest in real 
property, other than leases for a term not 
exceeding one year, nor any trust or power over or 
concerning real property or in any manner relating 
thereto, shall be created, granted, assigned, 
surrendered or declared otherwise than by act or 
operation of law, or by deed or conveyance in 
writing subscribed by the party creating, granting, 
assigning, surrendering- or declaring the same, or 
by his lawful agent thereunto authorized by 
writing. 
U. C. A. §57-1-27(1). On the date and at the time 
and place designated in the Notice of Sale, the 
trustee or the attorney for the trustee shall sell 
the property at public auction to the highest 
bidder. The trustee, or the attorney for the 
trustee, may conduct the sale and act as the 
auctioneer. The trustor, or his successor in 
interest, if present at the sale, may direct the 
order in which the trust property shall be sold, if 
the property consists of several known lots or 
parcels which can be sold to advantage separately. 
The trustee or attorney for the trustee shall 
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follow these directions. Any person, including the 
beneficiary or trustee, may bid at the sale... 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. History of the Case. 
This action is one to determine the invalidity of a 
trustee's sale. Competing motions for summary judgment were filed 
in the Fourth District Court. (R. 190.221. ) Summary judgment was 
entered in favor of the defendants by Judge Ballif of the Fourth 
District Court in May, 1987. (R. 268). That decision was appealed 
to the Supreme Court and later dismissed because of the lack of a 
Rule 54(b) order. (R. 462.) The trial court allowed the parties 
to augment the record and affirmed its prior ruling granting 
summary judgment in favor of the defendants. (R. 568) The trial 
court included in its Order a Rule 54(b) determination of finality. 
This case was transferred from the Supreme Court to the Court of 
Appeals on June 2 5, 1990. The Court of Appeals affirmed the 
District Court' s decision. 
& Relevant Facts. 
1. In November, 1983, Bodell Construction loaned 
Snelson and McOmbers $200,000. 00 pursuant to a note secured by a 
trust deed on McOmbers' residence. (McOmber Answer, 11 3, R. 11) 
2. No payments were ever made on the note. (McOmber 
deposition, R. 287, p. 22) 
3. On January 9, 1984, Bodell asked Roger Terry of 
Landmark Mortgage, the loan broker that was used by Snelson and 
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McOmber, to have someone begin foreclosure- Terry asked for and 
was given by Bodell the following letter to "get the ball rolling:" 
Gentlemen, 
Please accept this letter as authorization to 
immediately begin foreclosure against the property 
associated with this loan. 
We grant you and the title company of your 
choice full and complete authority regarding this 
foreclosure action. 
Please inform me if you require further 
information. 
Very truly yours, 
s/ Michael J. Bodell 
(Bodell's deposition dated 2/8/89, p. 26; the letter is Exhibit 6 
to Terry' s deposition dated 12/22/88. ) 
4. Terry told Bodell that he needed the January 9 
letter for "authorization to deliver papers to a trustee to start 
the foreclosure. If Terry ultimately asked Associated Title to act 
as the substitute trustee and start the foreclosure. (Terry 
deposition dated 12/22/88, p. 34-39.) 
5. There is no evidence that either Snelson or McOmber 
ever saw Bodell's letter of January 9, 1984. McOmber never spoke 
to Associated Title before the sale. (McOmber deposition, R. 287, 
p. 23. ) 
6. Snelson never had any contact with Bodell at any 
time. (Snelson deposition, R. 286, p. 25-26. ) 
7. Both Roger Terry (Landmark) and Blake Heiner (of 
Associated Title, the substitute trustee) stated that they never 
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understood that the January 9 letter gave them authority to 
determine the bid for Bodell at the trustee' s sale. (Affidavits of 
Blake Heiner and Roger Terry, R. 214, 211, copies attached as 
Exhibits 1 and 2.) 
8. Blake Heiner testified with regard to the January 9, 
1984 letter that: 
a. He never discussed it with Bodell or Terry 
(Heiner deposition dated 2/8/89, p. 21); and, 
b. that Associated Title would not have relied on 
the letter as giving it authority to determine the 
bid at the sale and that they did not do so in this 
case. (Heiner deposition, 2/8/89, p. 22, 1. 1-4, 
6-9. ) 
9. Roger Terry testified that he would be very 
surprised if Bodell took the position that Terry was handling the 
foreclosure sale for him. "I wasn't handling anything for him. 
The only thing that I did for him was to start the foreclosure. " 
(Terry deposition, 12/22/88, p. 126. ) 
10. Roger Terry of Landmark testified that his wife was 
contacted by Associated Title shortly before the sale and asked to 
give a payoff amount. Mr. Terry testified that he called 
Associated back with the loan payoff amount as requested. Terry 
understood that this amount was needed in case Snelson or McOmber 
wanted to pay the loan off prior to the sale. Terry never 
understood that he was being requested to give a bid amount for the 
sale. Terry knew at the time he called Associated and left a 
message giving the payoff amount that Bodell wanted to obtain a 
deficiency. (Terry deposition, p. 56, 57, 66, and Exhibit 5A. ) 
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11. Blake Heiner testified that he could not recall 
discussing with Terry any request for a bid amount in connection 
with this sale. Heiner agreed in his deposition that any 
conversation likely could have been in the form of a message left 
with Terry' s wife. When Mr. Heiner went to the sale, the only 
information that he had from Mr. Terry was in the form of a 
telephone message which stated, in full, that the "payoff on sale 
tomorrow ($243,127.15) plus foreclosure costs." (The telephone 
message is at R. 205. ) (Heiner deposition, pp. 11, 12, 44, 45. ) 
12. No one other than Blake Heiner of Associated Title 
attended the August 31, 1984 trustee' s sale. (Heiner affidavit, 11 
5, R. 211. ) 
13. The "Bid" referred to in the trustee's deed, dated 
September 11, 1984 was made by Blake Heiner at the sale on August 
31, 1984 and was based upon the telephone message he received from 
Terry which gave the "payoff" amount. (Heiner affidavit, 1F6, R. 
211, 212. ) No written authority was ever requested of or given by 
Bodell to Associated Title to (i) bid on its behalf at the sale 
(ii) or to enter any bid for any specific amount. 
14. There was no evidence that Snelson or McOmber ever 
discussed with Bodell, Associated Title or Terry at any time the 
amount to be bid at the sale. There was no evidence that Snelson 
or McOmber were ever aware of what amount was to be bid or was in 
fact bid at the sale. Neither Snelson nor McOmber attended the 
first sale. McOmber continued to reside in the home even after the 
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first sale. (McOmber deposition, R. 287, p. 22, 23; Heiner 
deposition, p. 19; Bodell deposition, p. 91. ) 
15. On or about October 3, 1984, and within a few days 
of when it first saw the "trustee's" deed, Bodell sought legal 
advice about how it could collect the balance due on its note. 
Prior to that date, neither Associated nor Landmark had explained 
to Bodell the role the amount bid at sale played in obtaining a 
deficiency. On October 3, 1984, Bodell learned for the first time 
that Associated' s unauthorized bid could affect Bode_ s right to 
obtain a deficiency. (Bodell deposition, 2/8/89, p. 1 >, 114, 84, 
82; Bodell affidavit, 116, 8, 9, R. 501-503. ) 
16. Bodell immediately contacted Associated Title and 
McOmber, and advised them that the bid had not been authorized. 
(R. 501-503; Bodell deposition, p. 113, 114, 84, 82. ) 
17. Associated Title accepted and recorded a quit claim 
deed back from Bodell which stated in part that "this deed is given 
to reconvey a trustee's deed which was recorded September 11, 1984 
which was erroneously given to Bodell Construction Company. " 
Associated recorded this deed, published a new notice of sale, and 
reconducted the sale on the 19th day of November, 1984. (R. 202, 
207. ) 
18. At no time did Bodell ever authorize or ratify, in 
writing, the alleged sale or the "bid" entered by Associated Title 
at the sale. 
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19. The property was resold on November 19, 1984. At 
this sale, a bid of $170,000.00 was made at the direction of 
Bodell. (R. 240. ) 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS NOT APPROPRIATE 
This case was decided on summary judgment. It was 
affirmed without opinion. The trial court concluded as a matter of 
law that "Associated Title had actual and apparent authority to 
conduct the Trustee's sale, and that the plaintiff [Bodell] 
ratified the Trustee7 s sale. . . " (R. 573. ) This conclusion was 
reached as a matter of law in spite of the following facts 
supporting exactly the opposite result: 
a. the trustee and loan broker each acknowledged 
that neither had authority to determine a bid for 
Bodell at the sale; (R. 211-214.) 
b. it was undisputed that Bodell had never been 
consulted regarding bidding at the sale; (R. 500-
503. ) 
c. Bodell never gave any bidding instructions for 
the sale to anyone; (R. 500-503, Bodell deposition, 
February 8, 1989, p. 36, 38, 64-69, 72, 114. ) 
d. Bodell never spoke to the trustor (McOmber) 
about Associated Title; (McOmber deposition, R. 
287, p. 22, 23. ) 
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e. when Bodell first saw the trustee' s deed it 
delivered to the trustee a quit-claim deed, which 
the trustee accepted and recorded, "to reconvey a 
trustee' s deed- . .which was erroneously given. " (R. 
207, 202) 
Because summary judgment was granted against Bodell, it 
is entitled to a review with all facts, and inferences to be drawn 
from those facts, considered in the light most favorable to it. 
Seftel v. Capital Citv Bank. 767 P. 2d 941 (Utah A. 1989). In a 
summary judgment proceeding, the trial court is not to weigh the 
evidence and its credibility. Even if the facts are undisputed, 
they must be such that conflicting inferences cannot be drawn from 
them. Sandbera v. Klein, 576 P. 2d 1291 (Utah 1978). The evidence 
must preclude any reasonable probability that Bodell could prevail 
at trial. Judkins v. Toone, 492 P. 2d 980 (Utah 1980). 
How can there be a finding by the trial court of a grant 
of actual authority where the trustee acknowledges there is none? 
How can there be a finding by the trial court, as a matter of law, 
of apparent authority when there has been no contact between the 
principle (Bodell) and the third person (McOmber) regarding the 
trustee, other than the statutory notices? How can there be a 
finding, as a matter of law, by the trial court of ratification 
when the trustee's deed is refused and a deed "to reconvey a 
trustee' s deed. . . which was erroneously given. . . " is delivered to 
the trustee and recorded by the trustee within days of the time the 
beneficiary first sees the trustee' s deed? 
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It is hornbook law that an agent' s authority is "composed 
of his [1] actual authority, express or implied, together with the 
[2] apparent or ostensible authority which the principal by his 
conduct precludes himself from denying. 2 A. C. J. S. Agency, §146. 
Because the statements by both Associated Title and 
Landmark created, at a minimum, a factual dispute regarding express 
authority, it must be presumed that summary judgment was based upon 
implied or apparent authority. In the circumstances of this case, 
implied or apparent authority in Associated Title to bid for Bodell 
at the August trustee' s sale can flow only from the fact that 
Associated Title was a trustee, the only entity authorized by Utah 
statute to foreclose the trust deed. The trial court' s summary 
judgment had to be based upon its conclusion that a statutory 
trustee under a trustee' s deed has plenary power to determine and 
enter a bid on behalf of a beneficiary at a foreclosure sale simply 
by virtue of its status as a trustee. 
This conclusion ignores fundamental principles of law and 
prior related decisions of this Court. 
It cannot be contended in this matter, in the face of the 
affidavits of Associated Title and Landmark Mortgage, (R. 211,214) 
that there was express authority given in writing even by the 
January 9, 1989 letter, to Associated Title to determine and enter 
a bid at the sale on behalf of Bodell Construction. 
The only other writing potentially capable of conferring 
authority to bid on Associated Title was the trust deed. And there 
was no language in the trust deed which authorizes the trustee to 
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determine or enter a bid on behalf of the beneficiary (or the 
trustor) at the sale. Taken to its extreme, which is what occurred 
in this case, the trial court has determined that a trustee can 
appear at a sale in its capacity as a trustee, enter a bid without 
direction, and that bid becomes binding upon either party to the 
sale. 
Such plenary power cannot exist for at least two reasons. 
First, this court has previously recognized that trustees under 
trust deeds owe both the trustor and the beneficiary a fiduciary 
duty to act fairly. Bloda t v. artsch, 590 P. 2d 298 (Utah 1^8). 
This dual obligation precludes . finding of inherent or plenary 
authority in a trustee to determine and enter a bid at the sale on 
behalf of either party, absent express written authority from one 
party or the other expressly authorizing the circumstances upon 
which a bid may be entered on its behalf at the sale. 
Second, the statute of frauds, U. C. A. §25-5-1, requires 
that the authority to bid, which is a power over real property, be 
granted in writing. Stated simply, a trustee at a statutory 
foreclosure sale should be required to have written instructions in 
order to be able to bid at the sale for either a trustor or a 
beneficiary. Absent written instructions, the sale should be 
continued. A statutory trustee is not, and cannot be, an agent 
with inherent authority to bid for either party at the sale. 
For the same reasons, the principles of apparent 
authority have no application to a trustee' s sale. In this case, 
the evidence as that Bodell and McOmber did not talk about 
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Associated Title. Apparent authority could have arisen only from 
Associated Title conducting itself as a trustee. A trustee is the 
only person or entity authorized to conduct a trustee' s foreclosure 
sale. The trust deed foreclosure statutes, U.C. A. §57-1-27 
recognize the right of a trustee to bid. They do not, however, 
confer a trustee with authority apparent or otherwise, to determine 
and enter a bid for either party. 
Any universal rule of plenary authority in a trustee to 
determine a bid and enter it on behalf of either party would 
destroy the dual fiduciary obligation of the trustee. 
II. 
BODELL DID NOT RATIFY THE AUGUST TRUSTEE'S SALE 
Again, this matter was determined by summary judgment in 
the District Court. This court should review all facts in the 
light most favorable to Bodell. Seftel v. Capitol City Bank. 767 
P. 2d 941 (Utah A. 1989). 
In order for ratification to occur, the following 
elements must be satisfied: (1) the principal's knowledge of 
material facts and (2) an intent by the principal to ratify. 3 Am. 
Jur. 2d Agency §185. Given Bodell's lack of understanding 
regarding the trust deed process, and the fact that he refused the 
trustee's deed and redelivered title (R. 202, 207), it cannot be 
concluded, as a matter of law, that Bodell ratified anything. At 
a minimum, there are conflicting inferences to be drawn. 
The trial court' s decision is also contrary to existing 
case law regarding ratification. Where the law requires that the 
- 15 -
authority to act in the first instance have been given in writing, 
the ratification must also be in writing. Bradshaw v. McBride. 64 9 
P. 2d 74 (Utah 1982); 3 Am. Jur 2d, Agency §185, s£. seq. 
The purported right of Associated Title to bid and 
purchase at the sale as an agent on behalf of Bodell Construction 
is a power over real property. U. C. A. §25-5-1. Because the 
authority of Associated Title to determine a bid and purchase the 
property at the foreclosure sale must be given in writing, any 
ratification of a previously unauthorized bid by Bodell must also 
be in writing. Williams v. Singleton. 723 P. 2d 421, 424 (Utah 
1986). Bradshaw v. McBride, supra. In this case, there is no 
writing by Bodell subsequent to the sale ratifying the sale. The 
first and only writing by Bodell to Associated Title subsequent to 
the first sale was a quit claim deed back to Associated Title given 
to ". . . reconvey a trustee' s deed. . . erroneously given. . . ". (R. 202, 
207. ) 
The trial court' s decision ignores the requirements of 
Sandbera, supra, and Bradshaw, supra. This Court should expressly 
determine or review that ratification of the bid also falls within 
the statute of frauds and must be given in writing. 
III. 
THERE WAS NO UNILATERAL MISTAKE BY BODELL 
The final basis upon which the trial court might have 
based its decision was that Bodell Construction made a unilateral 
mistake by failing to authorize any bid at the sale. In this 
action, it cannot be said that Bodell Construction made r.y mistake 
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regarding the bid at the sale. Bodell did not know that any amount 
had to be bid at the sale. (R. 501-503. ) Bodell did not know that 
Associated Title had requested information from Landmark Mortgage, 
even about a payoff amount. Any mistake was that of Associated 
Title. 
If this Court were to determine that the authority of the 
trustee to bid at a trustee' s sale on behalf of either the trustor 
or the beneficiary must be conferred in writing, then Bodell has 
made no mistake. 
Even if it could be said that Bodell had made some error 
in connection with the sale, the recent decision of this Court in 
the case of Guardian State Bank v. Stancrel, 778 P. 2d 1 (Utah 1989) 
recognizes the authority of the court to correct even a unilateral 
error. 
IV 
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PRINCIPLES INVOLVED 
The trial court has ignored the fundamental principle of 
Sandbera v. Klein, 576 P. 2d 1291 (Utah 1976). Many of the facts 
support exactly the opposite conclusion reached by the trial court. 
In addition, this case presents an opportunity for this Court to 
address (i) the interface between Blodaett, supra, and any notions 
of the implied and apparent authority of a trustee and (ii) the 
interface between the trust deed foreclosure statutes and the 
statute of frauds. None of these matters have been squarely 
addressed by this court. There was, in this case, no authority 
given to the trustee to determine and enter a bid for either party 
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at the sal-. There was no authorized buyer at the sale. Bodell 
lost its right to obtain a deficiency without having ever been 
consulted about the bid. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court, for the reasons set forth above, should grant 
a Writ of Certiorari and after appropriate examination, vacate the 
decision of the panel of the Utah Court of Appeals and of the trial 
court and remand the case for further decision. 
Respectfully submitted this / fy^Siav of April, 1991. 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P. C. 
Keith W. 
Attorney for Plaintiff, Appellant, 
Petitioner 
Meide 
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APPENDIX "A* 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
• 00O00 
FILSD 
•sierfc or :ns Court 
1
 "** Gewa <*t Appeals 
Bodell Construction Company, 
Inc. , 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
David I. McOmber, Rachael B. 
McOmber, Steven M. Snelson, and 
David I. McOmber and Rachael B. 
McOmber, Trustees of the David 
I. McOmber Family Trust, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE 
Case No. 900338-CA 
Before Judges Greenwood, Billings, and Jackson (On Rule 31 
Hearing). 
31. 
This matter is before the court pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the trial court's ruling granting 
summary judgment is affirmed. 
Dated this 20th day of March, 1991. 
ALfc CONCUR: 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
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J. RAND HIRSCHI, #1SC3 
DUNN & DUNN 
460 Midtown Plaza 
230 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 521-6666 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BODELL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DAVID I. McOMBER, RACHEL B. 
McOMBER, STEVEN M. SNELSON 
and DAVID B. McOMBER, TRUSTEES 
of the DAVID I. McOMBER 
FAMILY TRUST, 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 68297 
Judge Ballif 
This matter came on for hearing on defendant Snelson's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, the Honorable George E. Ballif, presiding. J. Rand Hirschi appeared for 
defendant Snelson and Keith W. Meade appeared for plaintiff. Summary judgment had 
been granted Snelson and the remaining defendants by a Judgment dated May 18, 1987, 
which plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court of Utah. That appeal was dismissed 
pursuant to Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, because it had not been certified as 
a final order. By an Order dated May 9, 1989, this Court granted both parties leave to 
augment the record with respect to the Summary Judgment. By agreement of the parties, 
depositions from a related action in the Third Judicial District were submitted by defendant 
Sneison, and plaintiff submitted additional affidavits. These submissions went to the 
issues of whether Associated Title, which had conducted the Trustee's sale here in 
question, had actual authority or apparent authority to conduct the sale and enter a bid, and 
to the issue of whether plaintiff had ratified the Trustee's sale. A memorandum was filed 
by defendant Sneison and by plaintiff, and the matter was argued and submitted. 
The "Disputed Facts" set forth in plaintiff's December 8, 1989 Memorandum in 
Opposition to Snelson's Motion for Summary Judgment do not contradict the facts relied 
upon by defendant Sneison. 
Both parties stated at the hearing that they knew of no reason to delay the entry of a 
final judgment, should the court affirm the judgment. 
Having considered the augmented record, and the memoranda and arguments of die 
parties, and having heretofore entered its Ruling dated March 31, 1990, the Court 
concludes that there remain no issues of material fact, that Associated Title had actual and 
apparent authority to conduct the Trustee's sale and enter a bid, and that plaintiff ratified the 
Trustee's sale, that a beneficiary cannot unilaterally abrogate a trustee's sale for his own 
advantage on the grounds of his own unilateral mistake, and that the summary judgment 
should be reaffirmed. 
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The Court hereby expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay in the 
entry of this final judgment on the issues between plaintiff and defendants, and hereby 
expressly directs the entry of final judgment. 
Accordingly, it is hereby, 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, 
That based on the augmented record, defendants* motion for summary judgment 
be, and the same hereby is, granted and plaintiffs complaint against defendants and all 
claims and causes of action that were or could have been asserted therein be, and hereby 
are, dismissed with prejudice and on the merits, with costs to defendants. 
DATED this ^»V day of < ^ o ^ ^ J ^ , 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
GEORGE E0ALUF 
District Court Judge 
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APPENDIX »C 
Keith W. Meade (Bar No, 2218) 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P. C. 
525 East First South, Fifth Floor 
P. O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
Telephone: (801) 532-2666 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BODELL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
DAVID I. McOMBER, RACHEL B. 
McOMBER, STEVEN M. SNELSON 
and DAVID B. McOMBER, 
TRUSTEES Of the DAVID I. 
McOMBER FAMILY TRUST, 
Defendants. 
* * * * * * * * 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: SS 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Michael Bodell, upon oath, states as follows: 
1. I was the vice president of the plaintiff, Bodell 
Construction at all times material hereto. I have personal 
knowledge of the matters set forth hereinafter. 
2. Prior to the August 31, 1984 trustee's sale, I told 
Roger Terry of Landmark that Bodell wanted to remain in a 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
MICHAEL BODELL 
Civil No. 68297 
Honorable George E. Ballif 
position to obtain a deficiency after the sale. 
3. Prior to the August 31 sale, I was not aware that 
Landmark had been asked to give or had given any dollar amount, 
as a payoff or otherwise, to Associated Title. 
4. I did not know prior to August 31 that Associated Title 
believed or had any reason to believe that it had been given any 
authority to bid at the sale. 
5. Nobody from Associated Title ever spoke to me prior to 
the August 31 sale. No one from Associated Title ever contacted 
me to inquire as to the extent of Landmark' s authority or about 
the January 9, 1984 letter. 
6. If Bodell Construction had been asked, either by 
Landmark Mortgage or Associated Title for instructions on 
bidding, and if Bodell had understood or had explained to it by 
anyone the relationship between the bid at sale and the 
availability of a deficiency, Bodell would never have authorized 
or consented to a "pay off" bid. 
7. After the August 31 sale, a new listing agreement for 
the property was signed with the same realtor that had had the 
property listed for sale for the McOmbers. The listing agreement 
hard been discussed even prior to the sale and it was my 
understanding that as a result of the sale it had to be changed. 
At all times subsequent to the first sale in August, the McOmbers 
continued to live in the property and continued to try to sell 
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and market the property. In October, the listing agreement was 
changed back and McOmbers were the listing party. They were 
thrilled at this and continued to live in the house and try to 
sell it- The listing realtor even kept exceptions to the listing 
agreement for McOmbers. Some time in September, Bodell received 
a $200.00 check, apparently from people living in the basement of 
the property. This payment was the only payment that Bodell ever 
received in connection with the property. Bodell never 
understood that it was not entitled to accept this check. The 
trust deed, paragraph 10, gave Bodell the right to receive rents 
upon default, 
8. At no time did Bodell ever understand that it was 
waiving or that it intended to waive any claim that i) the first 
sale of the property was not authorized, or ii) that Associated 
Title and Landmark Mortgage were not authorized to determine or 
enter a bid on behalf of Bodell at the sale. Bodell never 
voluntarily, intentionally or knowingly relinquished any known 
right in connection with its ability to obtain full payment under 
the trust deed note. Bodell never intended to voluntarily 
relinquish its right to obtain a deficiency against the trustors. 
9. Bodell never intended or expected or understood that 
any of its conduct subsequent to the first sale constituted a 
waiver, ratification or would result in an estoppel of Bodell to 
obtain full payment under the trust deed note. Bodell never 
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understood or intended that any of its conduct subsequent to the 
August 31 sale would serve to discharge or release any of the 
parties from liability for their unauthorized conduct. Bodell 
never understood that the unauthorized bid would hinder in any 
way Bodell's ability to obtain full satisfaction under the trust 
deed note. 
10. Bodell -.id not see th- trustee's deed from the first 
sale until very late in Septem: t or the first part of October. 
The trustee's deed was receivea immediately prior to my meeting 
with Richard Rappaport. 
11. I told Roger Terry prior to the sale that whatever was 
to happen that I wanted to keep the door open to obtain a 
deficiency. 
DATED this [n day of December, 1989. 
WmJi-U 
V :hael Bodell 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 
December, 1989. 
L. day of 
'MtAu J. 
My Commission Expires: 
Notary Public 
Residing at: 
SLC ( UA-AZ-U 
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Keith W. Meade (Bar No. 2218) 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT& SEGAL 
66 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 841H 
Telephone: (801) 532-2666 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * 
BODELL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, ) 
Plaintiff, ) AFFIDAVIT OF BLAKE HEINER 
vs. ) Civil No. 68297 
DAVID McOMBER, et al., ) Judge Ballif 
Defendants. ) 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
BLAKE HEINER, upon oath, states as follows: 
1. I am an officer of Associated title Company and have personal knowledge 
of the matters set forth herein. 
2. I was the officer of Associated Title who conducted the sales of thp' 
property described on Exhibit nA" attached, on August 31, 1984 and November 19, 1984. 
3. Prior to the August 31 sale, I had no communication with Michael Bodell or 
anyone from Bodell Construction. 
4. Prior to the August 31 sale, I received a telephone message from Rogei 
Terry of Landmark Mortgage, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit "BtT. I did not speal 
with Roger Terry regarding the message until after the August 31 sale. 
5. No one that I was aware of attended the sale of the property on August 31 
1984 other than myself. 
i i i 211 
6. The bid referred to in paragraph G of the Trustee's Deed recorded as Entr> 
No 27110 was made by myself based upon the telephone message referred to in paragraph 
4 above, that I received from Roger Terry. 
7. I was informed after the August 31 sale by Bodell Construction and Roger 
Terry that the amount referred to in paragraph G of the Trustee's Deed was not intendec 
to be a bid amount. 
8. I was never given, by Roger Terry, Landmark Mortgage, or anyone from 
Bodell Construction Company, any authority to determine the amount that was to be bic 
at the August 31 trustee's sale on behalf of Bodell Construction Company. 
9. The trustee's sale on November 19, 1984 was conducted at the request o) 
Bodell Construction because they told me that my bid at the August 31, 1984 sale wa< 
•lot authorized. 
DATED this day of February, 1987. 
^TUV 
Blake T. Heiner 
Vice President 
Associated Title Company 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me on the 4 th day of February, 1986, b; 
Blake T. Heiner, the signer of the foregoing ij 
Nd^ffy-Public 
Residing in S a l t Lake C i t y / Utah 
My Commission Expires: December 17/ 1988 
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F O R 
M 
. D A T E . E J C T T I M ^ ^ / 
O F . ^M--TELEPHONED 
P H O N E 
A^EACOOtr 
M E S L A G E 
> < % / - & & / 
RETURNED 
YOUR CALL 
^Ipadhu 
EXTEJMS»Qf* 
PLEASE CALL 
WILL CALL AGAIN 
Mr./£?-^to~nn 
_7 jJI JVSr/eST^'/plM 
SIGNED ^ / 
CAME 
TO SEE YOU 
WANTS 
TO SEE YOU 
TOPS £ FORM <*Q03 
Keith W. Meade (Bar No. 2218) 
COUNE, RAPPAPORT <5c SEGAL 
66 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-2CGG 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * 
BODELL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DAVID McOMBl R, et alM 
Dt fendants. 
* * * * * * * * 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
ROGET TERRY, upon oath, states as follows: 
1. I am an officer of Landmark Mortgage and have personal knowledge of the 
matters set forth herein. 
2. I never discussed with Mike Bodell or anyone from Bodell Construction the 
amount to be bid at the Trustee's sale conducted on August 31, 1984. 
3. At no time did I have authority from Mike Bodell or Bodell Construction to 
determine the amount which would be bid at the Trusteed sale of the property which 
occurred on August 3I f 1984. 
4. Prior to the sale, Blake Ilciner of Associated Title contacted me and asked for 
the payoff figure on the loan, 1 informed him of the payoff amount. I v/as not requested 
AFFIDAVIT OF ROGER TERRY 
Civil No. 68297 
Judge Ballif 
to provide any bidc^ ng . .structions wilh regard to the sale. 
DATED t h i s ^ _ day of January, 1987. 
/ 
• • i • • 
Roger Terry ^--' 
5TATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
BOUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me on the jw day of J/M/n/y./ , 1986, 
>y j/y*/ K i * t , the signer of the foregoing instrument. 
Notary Public / . / / / / -. / J ^ r 
Residing in ,<[: Ct j £ j £ fc"ti\ 
My Commission Exp res:' y 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Affidavit of Roger Terry was mailed, postage fully prepaid, this day of January, 
1987, to the following: 
B. Ray Zoll 
Attorney at Law 
5251 South Green Street, Suite 205 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Rand Hirschi 
Attorney at Law 
City Centre 
400 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(Bodell-2) 
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